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ABSTRACT
A question of increasing interest to researchers in a variety of fields is whether the incentives and
experience present in many “real world” settings mitigate judgment and decision-making biases. To
investigate this question, we analyze the decision making of National Football League teams during
their annual player draft. This is a domain in which incentives are exceedingly high and the
opportunities for learning rich. It is also a domain in which multiple psychological factors suggest
teams may overvalue the “right to choose” in the draft – non-regressive predictions, overconfidence,
the winner’s curse and false consensus all suggest a bias in this direction. Using archival data on
draft-day trades, player performance and compensation, we compare the market value of draft picks
with the historical value of drafted players. We find that top draft picks are overvalued in a manner
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Two of the building blocks of modern neo-classical economics are rational expectations 
and market efficiency.  Agents are assumed to make unbiased predictions about the future and 
markets are assumed to aggregate individual expectations into unbiased estimates of fundamental 
value.  Tests of either of these concepts are often hindered by the lack of data.  Although there are 
countless laboratory demonstrations of biased judgment and decision making (for recent 
compendiums see Kahneman & Tversky , 2000 and Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; ) there 
are fewer studies of predictions by market participants with substantial amounts of money at 
stake.  Similarly, tests of market efficiency are plagued by the inability to measure fundamental 
value.  (Even now, in 2005, there is debate among financial economists as to whether prices on 
Nasdaq were too high in 2000.)   
In this paper we offer some evidence on both of these important concepts in an unusual 
but interesting context:  the National Football League, specifically its annual draft of young 
players.  Every year the National Football League (NFL) holds a draft in which teams take turns 
selecting players. A team that uses an early draft pick to select a player is implicitly forecasting 
that this player will do well.  Of special interest to an economic analysis is that teams often trade 
picks.  For example, a team might give up the 4
th pick and get the 10
th pick and the 21
st pick in 
return.  In aggregate, such trades reveal the market value of draft picks.  We can compare these 
market values to the surplus value (to the team) of the players chosen with the draft picks. We 
define surplus value as the player’s performance value – estimated from the labor market for NFL 
veterans – less his compensation. In the example just mentioned, if the market for draft picks is 
rational then the surplus value of the player taken with the 4
th pick should equal (on average) the 
combined surplus value of the players taken with picks 10 and 21.   
The rate at which the value of picks declines over the course of the draft should, in a 
rational world, depend on two factors: the teams’ ability to predict the success rate of prospective 
players, and the compensation that has to be paid to drafted players.  If, to take an extreme   
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example, teams have no ability to forecast future value, then early picks are worth no more than 
later picks:  they are all equally valued lottery tickets.  A steeply declining price, on the other 
hand, implies that performance is highly predictable.  Compensation matters because if early 
picks are (for whatever reason) paid more, then the surplus to the teams who select them is 
reduced.  Indeed, if (hypothetically) early picks had to be paid more than later picks, and 
performance predictability were zero, then early picks would be less valuable than late picks.   
To illustrate the basic idea of the paper, consider one high-profile example from the 2004 
draft.  The San Diego Chargers had the rights to the first pick and used it to select a promising 
quarterback, Eli Manning.  Much was expected of Eli: he had a very successful collegiate career, 
and his father (Archie) and older brother (Peyton) were NFL stars.  Peyton had also been the first 
player selected in the 1998 draft and had become one of the best players in the league.  The New 
York Giants, picking 4
th, were also anxious to draft a quarterback, and it was no secret that they 
thought Manning was the best prospect in the draft.  It was reported (King, 2004) that during the 
15 minutes in which they had to make their selection the Giants had two very different options 
under consideration. They could make a trade with the Chargers in which case the Giants would 
select Philip Rivers, considered the second-best quarterback in the draft, and then swap players.  
The price for this “upgrade” was huge: the Giants would have to give up their third-round pick in 
2004 (the 65
th pick) and their first- and fifth-round picks in 2005.  Alternatively, the Giants could 
accept an offer from the Cleveland Browns to move down to the 7
th pick, where it was expected 
that they could select the consensus third best QB in the draft, Ben Roethlisberger.  The Browns 
were offering their second-round pick (the 37
th) in compensation.  In summary, Manning was four 
picks more expensive than Roethlisberger.   
As we will show below, the offer the Giants made to the Chargers was in line with 
previous trades involving the first pick.  They were paying the market price to move up, and that 
price is a steep one.  In addition, they knew that Manning would cost them financially.  
Historically the first pick makes about 60 percent more during his initial (4- to 5-year) contract   
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than the seventh pick.  Thus both in terms of pick value and monetary cost, the market prices 
imply that performance must be highly predictable.  But history is full of anecdotes that seem to 
tell the opposite story.  Success in the NFL, especially for quarterbacks, has been notoriously 
difficult to predict.  Indeed, the year in which Eli’s brother Peyton was taken with the first pick 
there was much speculation about whether another quarterback, Ryan Leaf, was a better prospect 
than Manning.  Leaf was taken with the very next pick (by the Chargers) and was as spectacularly 
unsuccessful as Manning was successful; after trials with several teams he eventually left the 
league a declared flop. 
In this paper we systematically investigate these issues.  Our initial conjecture in thinking 
about these questions was that teams did not have rational expectations regarding their ability to 
predict player performance.  A combination of well-documented behavioral phenomena, all 
working in the same direction, creates a systematic bias:  teams overestimate their ability to 
discriminate between stars and flops.  We reasoned that this would not be eliminated by market 
forces because, even if there are a few smart teams, they cannot correct the mis-pricing of draft 
picks through arbitrage.  There is no way to sell the early picks short, and successful franchises 
typically do not “earn” the rights to the very highest picks, so cannot offer to trade them away.   
Our findings suggest the biases we had anticipated are actually even stronger than we had 
guessed.  We expected to find that early picks were overpriced, and that the surplus values of 
picks would decline less steeply than the market values.  Instead we have found that the surplus 
value of the picks during the first round actually increases throughout the round:  the players 
selected with the final pick in the first round  on average produces more surplus to his team than 
than the first pick, and costs one quarter the price!   
The plan of the papers is as follows.  In section I we review some findings from the 
psychology of decision making that lead us to predict that teams will put too high a value on 
picking early.  In section II we estimate the market value of draft picks.  We show that the very 
high price the Giants paid in moving from the 4
th pick to the 1
st one was not an outlier.  Using a   
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data set of 276 draft day trades, we find that the implicit value of picking early is very high.  The 
first pick is valued as much as the 10
th and 11
th picks combined, and as much as the sum of the 
last four picks in the first round.  We also find that teams discount the future at an extraordinary 
rate.  In section III we examine the relation between draft order and compensation during the 
initial contract period.  We find that compensation also declines very steeply. So, very high draft 
picks are expensive in two ways:  high picks can be traded for multiple lower picks, and high 
picks are paid higher salaries.  In the following sections we ask whether these expensive picks are 
too expensive. In section IV we analyze the performance of drafted players.  We find that 
performance is correlated with draft order, as expected.  Players taken in the first round are more 
likely to be successful (be on the roster, start games, make the all-star game) than players taken in 
later rounds.  However, performance does not fall as steeply as the implicit price of draft picks. 
Still, these analyses do not answer the economic question of whether the early picks are mis-
priced.  We address this question in Section V.  We do this by first estimating player performance 
value using market prices of free agents as an indication of true value.  We use compensation data 
for the sixth year of a player’s career since by that stage of their careers players have had the 
opportunity to test the free-agent market. We regress total compensation on categorical 
performance data, including position fixed-effects.  We use the results of this model to value 
individual player’s year-by-year performances over the first 5 years of their career.  Combining 
this performance value with the player’s compensation costs  allows us to compute the surplus 
value to the team drafting each player.  We find that surplus value increases throughout the first 
round, i.e., late-first-round picks generate more value than early-first-round picks.  We conclude 
in section VI. 
 
I. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
The NFL draft involves two tasks that have received considerable attention from 
psychological researchers – predicting the future and bidding competitively. This research   
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suggests that behavior in these tasks can deviate systematically from rational models. In this 
section we draw on these findings to develop our research hypothesis.  In doing so we have an 
embarrassment of riches – research on non-regressive predictions, overconfidence, the winner’s 
curse, and false consensus suggests our hypothesis is over-determined.  While this means we will 
not be able to pin the blame on any one underlying cause, it strengthens the case for our 
overarching hypothesis: teams overvalue the right to choose. 
In their early work on representativeness, Kahneman & Tversky (1973) compare 
“intuitive” predictions to those by normative models.  One of their chief findings is that intuitive 
predictions are insufficiently regressive. That is, intuitive predictions are more extreme and more 
varied than is justified by the evidence on which they are based. They show this in a series of 
studies in which individuals predict future states (e.g., a student’s grade-point average) from 
current evidence of various forms (e.g., the results of a “mental-concentration” quiz). Normative 
models require combining this evidence with the prior probabilities of the future states (e.g., the 
historical distribution of grade-point averages), with the weight placed on the evidence 
determined by how diagnostic it is.  Hence, one can safely ignore prior probabilities when in 
possession of a very diagnostic evidence, but should lean on them heavily when the evidence is 
only noisily related to outcomes. In their studies, Kahneman & Tversky show that such weighting 
considerations are almost entirely ignored, even when individuals are aware of prior probabilities 
and evidence diagnosticity.  Instead, individuals extrapolate almost directly from evidence to 
prediction.  This results in predictions that are too extreme for all but the most diagnostic 
evidence. 
NFL teams face exactly this kind of task when they predict the future performance of 
college players – they must combine evidence about the player’s ability (his college statistics, 
scouting reports, fitness tests, etc.) with the prior probabilities of various levels of NFL 
performance to reach a forecast.  For example, over their first five years, players drafted in the 
first round spend about as many seasons out of the league (8%) or not starting a single game (8%)   
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as in the Pro Bowl (9%).  To the extent that the evidence about an individual player is highly 
diagnostic of a player’s NFL future, prior probabilities such as these can be given less weight. 
However, if the evidence is imperfectly related to future performance, then teams should 
“regress” player forecasts toward the prior probabilities. If teams act as Kahneman & Tversky’s 
subjects did, they will rely too heavily on evidence they accumulate on college players.  Indeed, 
to be regressive is to admit to a limited ability to differentiate the good from the great, and it is 
this skill that has secured NFL scouts and general managers their jobs.  
Overconfidence is a closely related concept in the psychological literature.  Simply put, 
people believe their knowledge is more precise than it is in fact.  A simple way this has been 
demonstrated is by asking subjects to produce confidence limits for various quantities, for 
example, the population of a city. These confidence limits are typically too narrow.  For example, 
in a review of 28 studies soliciting interquartile ranges (25
th-75
th percentile) for uncertain 
quantities, the median number of observations falling within the ranges was only 37.5% 
(normatively it should be 50%) (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). Performance was 
even worse when asked for broader intervals, e.g., 95% confidence intervals. This is related to 
non-regressive forecasts in that subjects are not giving sufficient weight to either the limits of 
their cognitive abilities nor to the inherent uncertainty in the world.   
An interesting and important question is how confidence depends on the amount of 
information available.  When people have more information on which to base their judgments 
their confidence can rationally be greater, but often information increases confidence more than it 
increases the actual ability to forecast the future.  For example, in one classic study, Oskamp 
(1965) asked subjects to predict the behavior of a psychology patient based on information 
excerpted from the patient’s clinical files.  Subjects received information about the patient in four 
chronological stages, corresponding to phases in the patient’s life, making judgments after each 
phase.  Subjects also reported confidence in the judgments they provided. While the accuracy of 
their judgments was relatively constant across the four stages, confidence increased dramatically.    
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As a consequence, participants progressed from being reasonably well calibrated in the beginning 
to being quite overconfident after receiving more information.  Slovic & Corrigan (1973) find a 
similar pattern in a study of horse-racing bettors (in Russo & Schoemaker, 2002).  
NFL teams face a challenge related to Oskamp’s experiment – making judgments about 
players while accumulating information about them. Teams track some players’ performance 
from their freshman year in college, with the intensity increasing dramatically in the year 
preceding the draft.  In the final months before the draft almost all players are put through 
additional drills designed to test their speed, strength, agility, intelligence, etc. While one might 
think such information can only improve a team’s judgment about a player, the research just 
described suggests otherwise.  Rather, as teams compile information about players, their 
confidence in their ability to discriminate between them might outstrip any true improvement in 
their judgment. 
Competitive bidding introduces another set of issues. It is well known that in situations in 
which many bidders compete for an item with a common but uncertain value then the winner of 
the auction often overpays (for a review see Thaler, 1988).  The winner’s curse can occur even if 
bidders have unbiased but noisy estimates of the object’s true worth, because the winning bidder 
is very likely to be someone who has overestimated the actual value of the object.  Rational 
bidders should recognize this adverse-selection problem and reduce their bids, especially as the 
number of other bidders increases. Instead, increasing the number of bidders results in more 
aggressive bidding (Kagel & Levin, 1986).  The winners curse was first documented in research 
on oil-lease bids (Capen, Clapp, & Campbell, 1971), and has since been observed in numerous 
field (cf. Dessauer, 1981; Roll, 1986) and experimental settings (cf. Samuelson & Bazerman, 
1985).  
Harrison & March (1984) suggest that a related phenomenon occurs when a single party 
selects from multiple alternatives.  If there is uncertainty about the true value of the alternatives, 
the decision-maker, on average, will be disappointed with the one she chooses. This problem,   
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which Harrison & March term “expectation inflation”, has paradoxical consequences. In the 
context of choosing football players, the implication is that the more players a team examines, the 
better will be the player they pick, but the more likely the team will be disappointed in the player.     
Harrison & Bazerman (1995) point out that non-regressive predictions, the winner’s 
curse, and expectation inflation have a common underlying cause – the role of uncertainty and 
individuals’ failure to account for it. The authors emphasize that these problems are exacerbated 
when uncertainty increases and when the number of alternatives increase. The NFL draft is a 
textbook example of such a situation – teams select among hundreds of alternative players, there 
are typically many teams interested in any given player, and there is significant uncertainty about 
the future value of the player.  Other than trying to reduce the uncertainty in their predictive 
models (which is both expensive and of limited potential), teams have little control over these 
factors.  If teams recognize the situation, they will hedge their bids for particular players, 
reducing the value they place on choosing one player over another. But if they are susceptible to 
these biases, they will “bid” highly for players, overvaluing the right to choose early. 
A final consideration is the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). This 
effect refers to a person’s tendency to believe that others are more similar to them in beliefs, 
preferences and behavior than they actually are.   For example, Ross et al asked their student 
participants to estimate the percentage of students who believed a woman would be named to the 
Supreme Court within a decade. Students who themselves believed this was likely, gave an 
average estimate of 63%, while those who did not believe it was likely gave an average estimate 
of 35%. This effect does not suggest that everybody believes they are in the majority on all 
issues, but rather that they believe others are more like them than they actually are.  In the NFL 
draft, the presence of a false concensus effect would mean that teams overestimate the extent to 
which other teams value players in the same way that they do. This has significant consequences 
for draft-day trades.  As we discuss below, most trades are of a relatively small “distance” for the 
purpose of drafting a particular player.  An alternative to making such a trade is to simply wait   
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and hope that other teams do not draft the player with the intervening picks.  False consensus 
suggests that teams will overestimate the extent to which other teams covet the same player, and 
therefore overestimate the importance of trading-up to acquire a particular player.  Such a bias 
will increase the value placed on the right to choose. 
Together these biases all push teams toward overvaluing picking early.  Teams 
overestimate their ability to discriminate between the best linebacker in the draft and the next best 
one, and to overestimate the chance that if they wait, the player they are hoping for will be chosen 
by another team.  Of course, there are strong incentives for teams to overcome these biases, and 
the draft has been going on for long enough (since 1936) that teams have had ample time to learn.  
Indeed, sports provides one of the few occupations (academia is perhaps another) where 
employers can easily monitor the performance of the candidates that they do not hire as well as 
those they hire.  (Every team observed Ryan Leaf’s failures, not only the team that picked him.)  
This should facilitate learning.  It should also be possible to overcome the false consensus effect 
simply by comparing a team’s initial ranking of players with the order in which players are 
selected.   
The null hypothesis of rational expectations and market efficiency implies that ratio of 
market values of picks will be equal (on average) to the ratio of surplus values produced.  . 






MV E SV ++
= ,          ( 1 )  
where MV is the market value of the draft pick and E(SV) is the expected surplus value of 
players drafted with the pick. 
We hypothesize that, in spite of the corrective mechanisms discussed above, teams will 
overvalue the right to choose early in the draft.  For the reasons detailed above, we believe teams 
will systematically pay too much for the rights to draft one player over another. This will be   
 11 







MV E SV ++
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i.e., that the market value of draft picks will decline more steeply than the surplus value 
of players drafted with those picks.
1   Furthermore, we expect this bias to be most acute at the top 
of the draft, as three of the four mechanisms we’ve highlighted will be exaggerated there. 
Regression-to-the-mean effects are strongest for more extreme samples, so we expect the failure 
to regress predictions to be strongest there as well.
2  Players at the top of the draft receive a 
disproportionate amount of the attention and analysis, so information-facilitated overconfidence 
should be most extreme there.  And the winner’s curse increases with the number of bidders.  
Although not always the case, we expect more bidders for the typical player near the top of the 
draft than for the players that come afterwards. False consensus is an exception, as there is 
typically more true consensus at the top of the draft. We suspect false consensus plays a stronger 
role with the considerable amount of trading activity that takes place in the middle and lower 
rounds of the draft.  On balance, though, we expect overvaluation to be most extreme at the top of 
the draft.  That is, at the top of the draft we expect the relationship between the market value of 
draft picks and draft order to be steeper than the relationship between the value of players drafted 
and draft order.  
More generally, we are investigating whether well established judgment and decision 
making biases are robust to market forces. The NFL seems to provide almost ideal conditions for 
overcoming these psychological biases. As Michael Lewis, author of Moneyball, said of another 
                                                 
1 Note that this expression, by itself, does not imply which side of the equation is “wrong”. While our 
hypothesis is that the left-hand side is the problem, an alternative explanation is that the error is on the 
right-hand side. This is the claim Bronars (Bronars, 2004) makes, in which he assumes the draft-pick 
market is rational and points out its discrepancy with subsequent player compensation. A key difference in 
our approaches is that we also use player performance to explore which of the two sides, or markets, is 
wrong.  
2 Similarly, De Bondt & Thaler (1985) found the strongest mean reversion in stock prices for the most 
extreme performers over the past three to five years.     
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sport, “If professional baseball players, whose achievements are endlessly watched, discussed and 
analyzed by tens of millions of people, can be radically mis-valued, who can’t be?  If such a 
putatively meritocratic culture as professional baseball can be so sloppy and inefficient, what 
can’t be?” (Lewis, in Neyer, 2003). On one hand we agree wholeheartedly with Lewis – one 
would be hard-pressed to generate better conditions for objective performance evaluation. 
Consequently, we consider our hypothesis a rather conservative test of the role of psychological 
biases in organizational decision making.  But on the other hand, ideal conditions may not be 
sufficient for rational decision making. Considering that any one of the psychological factors 
discussed in this section could strongly bias NFL teams, we would not be surprised to find the 
NFL draft as “sloppy and inefficient” as Lewis found major league baseball. 
 
II. THE MARKET FOR NFL DRAFT PICKS 
In this section we estimate the market value of NFL draft picks as a function of draft 
order.  We value the draft picks in terms of other draft picks.  We would like to know, for 
example, how much the first draft pick is worth relative to say, the fifth, the fifteenth, or the 
fiftieth.  We infer these values from draft-day trades observed over 17 years.    
A. Data 
The data we use are trades involving NFL draft picks for the years 1988 through 2004.
3 
Over this period we observe 334 draft-day trades.  Of these, we exclude 51 (15%) that involve 
NFL players in addition to draft picks, and 6 (2%) with inconsistencies implying a reporting 
error.  We separate the remaining trades into two groups: 213 (64%) involving draft picks from 
only one year and 63 (19%) involving draft picks from more than one year.  We begin by 
focusing on trades involving a single draft year and subsequently incorporate the multi-year 
trades in a more general model. 
                                                 
3 This dataset was compiled from newspaper reports.  We are missing the second day (of two) of the 1990 
draft.   
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The NFL draft consists of multiple rounds, with each team owning the right to one pick 
per round.  (The order that teams choose depends on the team’s won-lost record in the previous 
season—the worst team chooses first, and the winner of the Super Bowl chooses last.)  During the 
period we observe, the NFL expanded from 28 to 32 teams and reduced the number of rounds 
from 12 to 7.   This means the number of draft picks per year ranges from 222 (1994) to 336 
(1990).  We designate each pick by its overall order in the draft.  In the 213 same-year trades, we 
observe trades involving picks ranging from 1st to 333rd.  Figure 1 depicts the location and 
distance for all trades in which current-year draft-picks were exchanged (n=238). While we 
observe trades in every round of the draft, the majority of the trades (n=126, 53%) involve a pick 
in one of the first two rounds.  The average distance moved in these trades (the distance between 
the top two picks exchanged) was 13.3 (median=10).  The average distance moved is shorter for 
trades involving high draft picks, e.g., 7.8 (median=7) in the first two rounds. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Trades often involve multiple picks (indeed, the team trading down requires something 
beyond a one-for-one exchange of picks).  The average number of picks acquired by the team 
trading down was 2.2 (sd=.83), with a maximum of 8.  The average number of picks acquired by 
the team trading up is 1.2 (sd=.50), with a maximum of 5.  The modal trade was 2-for-1, 
occurring 159 times (58%). 
B. Methodology 
We are interested in estimating the value of a draft pick as a function of its order and in 
terms of other draft picks.  We will take the first pick in the draft as the standard against which all 
other picks are measured.  We assume the value of a draft pick drops monotonically with the   
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pick’s relative position and that it can be well described using a Weibull distribution.
4 Our task is 
then estimating the parameters of this distribution. 
Let 
r
i t denote the t-th pick in the draft, either for the team with the relatively higher draft 
position (if r=H) and therefore “trading down”, or the team with the relatively lower draft 
position (if r=L) and therefore “trading up”. The index i indicates the rank among multiple picks 
involved in a trade, with i=1 for the top pick involved. 
For each trade, we observe the exchange of a set of draft picks that we assume are equal 










,          ( 3 )    
where m picks are exchanged by the team trading down for n picks from the team trading up. 
Assuming the value of the picks follow a Weibull distribution, and taking the overall first pick as 





β λ −− = ,          ( 4 )    
where λ and β  are parameters to be estimated.  Note that the presence of the β  parameter 
allows the draft value to decay at either an increasing or decreasing rate, depending on whether its 
value is greater than or less than one.  If  1 β =  we have a standard exponential with a constant 
rate of decay.  Also, note that for the first pick in the draft, 
(1 1) (1) 1.0 ve
β λ −− == . 
Substituting (4) into (3) and solving in terms of the highest pick in the trade, we have 
                                                 
4 A Weibull distribution is a 2-parameter exponential.  The single parameter in an exponential indicates the 
constant rate at which the distribution “decays”. The additional parameter in the Weibull allows this decay 
rate to either increase or decrease.  Consequently, the Weibull provides a very flexible distribution with 
which to estimate the decay of draft-pick value.    
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,        (5)           
which expresses the value of the top pick acquired by the team trading up in terms of the other 
picks involved in the trade.  Recall that this value is relative to the first pick in the draft. We can 
now estimate the value of the parameters λ and β  in expression (5) using nonlinear regression.
5   
We would also like to value future draft picks. Modifying (4) to include a discount 
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for a draft pick n years in the future.  This expression reduces to (4) when n=0, i.e., the pick is for 
the current year.  Substituting (6) into (3) and solving in terms of the highest pick in the trade, 
which by definition is in the current year, gives us 
1
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,      (7)          
which simplifies to (5) if all picks are in the current draft. 
C. Results 
Using the 213 same-year trades described above, we find λ =.148 (se=.03) and β =.700 
(se=.033).  The model fits the data exceedingly well, with 
2 R =0.999.  These results are 
summarized in Table 1, column 1.  A Weibull distribution with these parameters is graphed in 
Figure 2.  This graph shows the value of the first 100 draft picks (approximately the first 3 
rounds) relative to the first draft pick.  This curve indicates that the 10
th pick is worth 50% of the 
1
st overall pick, the 20
th is worth 31%, the 30
th is worth 21%, etc. 
                                                 
5 We first take the log of both sides of expression (5) before estimation in order to adjust for lognormal 
errors.   
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------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Figure 3 provides another means of evaluating the model’s fit.  This graph compares the 






), and the value paid for that pick by the team moving up net of the value of 
additional picks acquired (
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 ), where ˆ λ and
ˆ β  are estimated parameters.   
The model fits the data quite well.  We can also identify on this graph those trades that appear to 
be “good deals” for the team trading up (those below the line) and those that appear to be “bad 
deals” for the team trading up (those above the line), relative to the market price.   
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
We also estimated (7), which includes a third parameter for the discount rate.  This 
expression allows us to include trades involving future picks, expanding our sample to 276 
observations. Results are presented in Table 1, column 2.  The estimated curve is close to the 
previous one, with λ =.121 (se=.023) and β =.730 (se=.030), though a bit flatter – e.g., the 10
th 
pick is valued at 55% of the first.  The estimated discount rate, ρ , is a staggering 173.8% 
(se=.141) per year. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Finally, we investigate how these draft-pick values have changed over time.  To do this 
we estimate separate models for the first half (1988-1996, n=131) and second half (1997-2004, 
n=145) of our sample.  Results are presented in Table 1, columns 3 and 4.  In the first period we 
find λ =.092 (se=.029), β =.775 (se=.052), and ρ =159% (se=.237).  In the second period   
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λ =.249 (se=.064), β =.608 (se=.042), and ρ =173.5% (se=.126).  Differences in the estimates 
for the Weibull parameters, λ and β , are statistically significant, while the difference in the 
discount rate estimates are not.   We graph the curves for both periods in Figure 4.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
The change in the market value of the draft picks is most easily seen by comparing across 
time the implied value of various picks.  In the first period, for example, the 10
th pick is worth 
60% of the 1
st, while in the second period it is worth only 39% of the 1
st.  The value of the 20
th 
pick dropped from 41% to 22%, and the value of the 30
th from 29% to 15%.  Overall, the draft-
pick value curve is steeper in the second period than in the first for all picks in the first round. 
D. Discussion 
One of the most striking features of these data is how well ordered they are – it seems 
clear there is a well understood market price for draft picks. Indeed, the use of this kind of “value 
curve” has caught on throughout the NFL in recent years. A few years ago Jimmy Johnson, a 
former coach turned television commentator, discussed such a curve during television coverage 
of the draft, and in 2003 ESPN.com posted a curve it said was representative of curves that teams 
use.
6  The ESPN curve very closely approximates the one we estimate for the 1997-2004 period. 
The close fit we obtain for our model suggests there is wide agreement among teams (or at least 
those who make trades) regarding the relative value of picks.  This historical consensus may lend 
the considerable power of inertia and precedent to the over-valuation we suggest has 
psychological roots.  
A second striking feature is how steep the curve is.  The drop in value from the 1
st pick to 
the 10
th is roughly 50%, and another 50% drop from there to the end of the first round.  As, we 
                                                 
6 An NFL team confirmed that “everybody has one” of these curves.  The one they shared with us was very 
close to the one we estimate for the second half of our sample, with the notable exception that it was not 
continuous.    
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report in the following section, compensation costs follow a very similar pattern.    Moreover, the 
prices are getting steeper with time.  In the first period, the value of the 10
th pick is 60% of the 1
st 
pick, whereas in the later period, the 10
th pick is only worth 39% of the 1
st pick.  Since we will 
argue that even the earlier curve was too steep, the shift has been in the “wrong” direction, that is, 
it has moved further away from rational pricing.  
A third notable feature of these data is the remarkably high discount rate, which we 
estimate to be 174% per year.  A closer look at trading patterns suggests that this rate, though 
extreme, accurately reflects market behavior. Specifically, teams seem to have adopted a rule of 
thumb indicating that a pick in this year’s round n is equivalent to a pick in next year’s round n-1.  
For example, a team trading this year’s 3
rd-round pick for a pick in next year’s draft would expect 
to receive a 2
nd-round pick in that draft.  This pattern is clear in the data. Eighteen of the 26 trades 
involving 1-for-1 trades for future draft picks follow this pattern.  Importantly, the 8 trades that do 
not follow it all involve picks in the 4
th round or later, where more than one pick is needed to 
compensate for the delay, since one-round differences are smaller later in the draft (i.e., the curve 
is flatter).  
This trading pattern means that the discount rate must equate the value of picks in two 
adjacent rounds.  The curve we estimated above suggests that the middle pick of the 1
st round is 
worth .39 (relative to the top pick), the middle pick of the 2
nd round is worth .12, and the middle 
pick of the 3
rd is worth .05.  The discount rate required to equate this median 1
st-round pick with 
the median 2
nd-round pick is 225%, while the rate required to equate the median 2
nd-round pick 
with the median 3
rd–round pick is 140%.  Given these rates, and where trades occur (the majority 
involve a pick in one of the top two rounds), our estimate seems to very reasonably capture 
market behavior.    
This huge premium teams pay to choose a player this year rather than next year is 
certainly interesting, but is not the primary focus of this paper so we will not analyze it in any 
detail.  We suspect that one reason why the discount rate is high is that picks for the following   
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year have additional uncertainty attached to them since the exact value depends on the 
performance of the team trading away the pick in the following year.
7  Still, this factor alone 
cannot explain a discount rate of this magnitude.  Clearly teams giving up second-round picks 
next year for a third-round pick this year are displaying highly impatient behavior, but it is not 
possible to say whether this behavior reflects the preferences of the owners or the employees 
(general manger and coach) who make the choices (or both).  Regardless, it is a significant 
arbitrage opportunity for those teams with a longer-term perspective. 
 
III. INITIAL COMPENSATION COSTS 
We have shown that the cost of moving up in the draft is very high in terms of the 
opportunity cost of picks.  Early picks are expensive in terms of compensation as well.  NFL 
teams care about salary costs for two reasons.  First, and most obviously, salaries are outlays, and 
even behavioral economists believe that owners prefer more money to less.  The second reason 
teams care about compensation costs is that NFL teams operate under rules that restrict how 
much they are allowed to pay their players—a salary cap.  We will spare the reader a full 
description of the salary cap rules – for an excellent summary see Hall & Limm (2002). For our 
purposes, a few highlights will suffice.  Compensation is divided into two components: salary and 
bonus.  A player’s salary must be counted against the team’s cap in the year in which it is paid.  
Bonuses, however, even if they are paid up front, can be amortized over the life of the contract as 
long as the player remains active.  If the player leaves the league or is traded, the remaining bonus 
is charged to the team’s salary cap.   
In addition to this overall salary cap, there is a rookie salary cap, a “cap within a cap”.  
Teams are allocated an amount of money they are permitted to spend to hire the players they 
selected in the draft.  These allocations depend on the particular picks the team owns, e.g., the 
                                                 
7 We simply use the middle pick of the round when calculating the discount rate. Empirically, there is no 
reliable difference between the average pick position of teams acquiring future picks (15.48) and those 
disposing future picks (16.35).   
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team that owns the first pick is given more money to spend on rookies than the team with the last 
pick, all else equal.  When teams and players negotiate their initial contracts, the rookie salary cap 
plays an important role.  The team that has drafted the player has exclusive rights to that player 
within the NFL.  A player who is unhappy with his offer can threaten to hold out for a year and 
reenter the draft, or go play in another football league, but such threats are very rarely carried out.  
Teams and players typically come to terms, and the rookie salary cap seems to provide a focal 
point for these negotiations.  As we will see briefly, initial compensation is highly correlated with 
draft order. 
The salary data we use here and later come from published reports in USA Today and its 
website.  For the period 1996-2002 the data include base salary and bonuses paid, i.e., actual team 
outlays.  For 2000-2002 we also have the “cap charge” for each player, i.e., each players’ 
allocation against the team’s salary cap.  The distinguishing feature of this accounting is that 
signing bonuses are prorated over the life of the contract, meaning that cap-charge compensation 
measures are “smoother” than the base+bonus measures.
8 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
At this stage we are interested only in the initial costs of signing drafted players, so we 
consider just the first year’s compensation using our 2000-2002 cap-charge dataset.  Figure 5 
shows first-year compensation (cap charges) as a function of draft order for 1996-2002.  This 
pattern holds – though tempered over time – through the players’ first five years, after which 
virtually all players have reached free agency and are therefore under a new contract, even if 
remaining with their initial teams.
9  The slope of this curve very closely approximates the draft-
                                                 
8 If players are cut or traded before the end of their contract, the remaining portion of the pro-rated bonuses 
is accelerated to that year’s salary cap.  So the real distinction between base+bonus numbers and cap 
charges is that the base+bonus charges are disproportionately distributed at the beginning of a player’s 
relationship with a team, while the cap charges are, on average, disproportionately distributed at the end.  
9 Players are not eligible for free agency until after their 3
rd year in the league.  After 4 years players are 
eligible for restricted free agency.  After 5 years players are unrestricted free agents and can negotiate with   
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pick value curve estimated in the previous section.  Players taken early in the draft are thus 
expensive on both counts: foregone picks and salary paid.  Are they worth it? 
 
IV.  ON-FIELD PERFORMANCE 
Recall that in order for the high value associated with early picks to be rational the 
relation between draft order and on-field performance must be very steep.  The market value of 
the first pick in the first round, for example, is roughly four times as high as the last pick in the 
first round, and the player selected first will command a salary nearly four times higher than the 
player taken 30
th.  Does the quality of performance fall off fast enough to justify these price 
differences?  In the section following this one we will answer that question using a simple 




Since we want to include players in every position in our analyses we report four 
performance statistics that that are common across all positions: probability of being on a roster 
(i.e., in the NFL), number of games played, number of games started, and probability of making 
the Pro Bowl (a season ending “All-Star” game).
 We have these data for the 1991-2002 seasons.
10   
Our analysis involves all players drafted between 1991 and 2002. This means that we 
observe different cohorts of players for different periods of time – e.g., we observe the class of 
1991 for 12 seasons, but the class of 2002 for only one.  While we cannot avoid this cohorting 
effect, meaning draft classes carry different weights in our analysis, we are not aware of any 
                                                                                                                                                 
any team. This timeframe can be superseded by an initial contract that extends into the free-agency period, 
e.g., 6 years and longer.  Such contracts were exceedingly rare in the period we observe, though they have 
become more common lately. 
10 All performance data are from Stats.Inc.  1991 is the earliest season for which the “games started” are 
reliable.   
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systematic bias this imparts to our analyses.
11  An additional methodological issue is how to treat 
players who leave the NFL.  For our analysis it is important that our sample is conditioned on 
players who are drafted, not players who are observed in the NFL during a season.  Consequently, 
we keep all drafted players in our data for all years, recording zeros for performance statistics for 
those seasons a player is not in the NFL. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
Observations in these data are player-seasons.  We have 20,874 such observations, which 
are summarized in Table 2.  In our sample, the mean probability of making an NFL roster is 47% 
per year, while the probability of making the Pro Bowl is 2% per year.  The mean number of 
games started per season is 3.19, and the mean number of games played in per season is 6.0 (NFL 
teams play 16 regular season games per year.  We do not include play-off games in our analysis).  
Panel B of Table 2 shows how these performance measures change over time.  The probability of 
making a roster peaks in the player’s first year (66%).  Games played peaks in year 2 (mean=8.2), 
starts in year 4 (mean=4.2), and the probability of making the Pro Bowl in year 6 (3.9%).  Recall 
that the sample is conditioned on the player being drafted, so these means include zeros for those 
players out of the league.  This panel also highlights the cohort effect in our sample, with the 
number of observations declining with experience. One consequence is that our data are weighted 
toward players’ early years, e.g., 52% of our observations are from players’ first 4 years. 
B. Analysis 
Our main interest is how player performance varies with draft order.  Table 3 summarizes 
our data by draft order, showing the average performance for players taken in each round of the 
draft.  Mean performance generally declines with draft round. For example, first-round picks start 
an average of 8.79 games per season in our sample, while 7
th-round picks start 1.21 games per 
                                                 
11 We have done similar analyses on a sample restricted to players drafted 1991-1998, so that we observe a 
full five years from all players.  The graphs are virtually identical.   
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season.  The table also lists performance in each round relative to the first round, placing all four 
statistics on the same scale.  We graph these relative performance statistics in Figure 6. We limit 
this graph to the first 7 rounds, the length of the draft since 1994.  The graph shows that all 
performance categories decline almost monotonically with draft round.  This decline is steepest 
for the more extreme performance measures – probability of Pro Bowl is steeper than starts, 
which is steeper than games played, which is steeper than probability of roster.  Finally, we 
include on the graph the compensation curve we estimated in the previous section.  This curve is 
steeper than all the performance curves except the Pro Bowl curve, which it roughly 
approximates. The fact that performance declines more slowly than compensation suggests that 
early picks may not be good investments, just as we report in the next section. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
This analysis shows how performance varies with large differences in draft position – the 
average difference across our one-round categories is 30 picks.  A complementary analysis is to 
consider performance variation with smaller differences in draft position. After all, teams trading 
draft picks typically do not move up entire rounds, but rather half rounds (recall that the overall 
average move is 13.3 picks), and even less at the top of the draft (the average move is 7.8 picks in 
the top two rounds).  One way to investigate these smaller differences is to consider whether a 
player is better than the next player drafted at his position.  Two observations suggest such an 
analysis would be appropriate.  First, draft-day trades are frequently for the purpose of drafting a 
particular player, implying the team prefers a particular player over the next one available at his 
position. So a natural question is whether there are reliable differences in the performance of two 
“adjacent” players. A second observation suggesting this analysis is the average difference 
between “adjacent” draftees of the same position, 8.26 picks, very closely matching the average 
move by teams trading picks in the top 2 rounds (7.8). 
-------------------------------   
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Insert Figure 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
For this analysis we consider a player’s performance over his observed career.  Using the 
performance data described above, we observe 3,114 drafted players for an average of 4.8 years.  
We use two comparisons to determine which player is “better” – the average number of games 
started per season, and the per-season probability of making the Pro Bowl.  Using all players from 
1991-2002 drafts, we consider whether a player performs better than subsequent players drafted 
at his same position.  We use two different samples in this analysis – one that includes all rounds 
of the draft, and one that includes only the first round. Finally, we vary the lag between players – 
from 1 (i.e., the next player at drafted at his position) to 4.  One way to think of this analysis is 
that we’re asking how far a team has to trade up (within a position) in order to obtain a player that 
is significantly better than the one they could have picked without moving. Note that this analysis 
is silent on the cost of trading up, focusing exclusively on the benefits.  
One methodological challenge in this analysis is dealing with ties. Since we are interested 
in the probability a player performs better than another player, we would normally expect a 
binary observation – 1 for yes and 0 for no.  But ties are relatively common, and informative.  
Censoring them would remove valuable information, while grouping them with either of the 
extreme outcomes would create a significant bias.  Hence we code ties as .5.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
The results are shown in Figure 7.  There are three notable features in the data. First, for 
the broadest samples, the probabilities are near chance. Across all rounds, the probability that a 
player starts more games than the next player chosen at his position is 53%.  For the same sample, 
the probability that a player makes more Pro Bowls than the next player chosen at his position is 
51%.  Second, these probabilities are higher in the first-round sample than in the full sample.  For 
example, the probabilities of the higher pick performing better in 1-player-lagged comparisons   
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are 58% and 55% for starts and Pro Bowls, respectively, for players drafted in the first round.  
Finally, longer lags improve discrimination for starts but not for Pro Bowls.  For example, across 
all rounds, the probability of the higher pick starting more games rises from 53% to 58% as we 
move from 1-player lags to 4-player lags. The rise is even steeper in the first round, increasing 
from 58% to 69%.  The probability of making the Pro Bowl, however, is quite constant for all 
lags, in both samples. 
C. Discussion 
There are three important features of the relationship between on-field performance and 
draft order: 1) performance declines with the draft round (for all measures and almost all rounds), 
2) the decline is steeper for more extreme performance measures, and 3) only the steepest decline 
(Pro Bowls) is as steep as the compensation costs of the draft picks. 
We should note that there are two biases in the data that work toward making measured 
performance decline more steeply than actual performance.  First, teams may give high draft 
picks, particularly early first round picks, “too much” playing time. Such a bias has been found in 
the National Basketball Association (by Camerer & Weber, 1999; and Staw & Hoang, 1995). 
These researchers found that draft-order predicts playing time beyond that which is justified by 
the player’s performance. The explanation is that teams are loath to give up on high draft-choices 
because of their (very public) investment in them.  It seems likely this bias exists in the NFL as 
well, which has a similarly expensive, high-profile college draft.  If so, our performance statistics 
for high draft-choices will look better than they “should”. This is especially true in our sample, 
which is disproportionately weighted by players’ early years.  To the extent that such a bias exists 
in the NFL, these results suggest even more strongly that draft-pick value declines too steeply. 
The data on Pro Bowl appearances are also biased in a way that makes the performance-
draft-order curve too steep.  Selections to the Pro Bowl are partly a popularity contest, and 
players who were high first round picks are likely to have greater name recognition.   
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The within-position analysis provides a finer-grain look at performance by draft order.  
Here we see that whether a player will be better than the next player taken at his position is close 
to a coin-flip.  These odds can be improved by comparing against those who are taken 3 or 4 
players later (again, within position), or by focusing on first-round comparisons only. But even in 
those cases the probability that one player is better than those taken after him are relatively 
modest. Combined these analyses suggest that player performance is quite different across draft 
rounds, but not very different within rounds. In other words, draft order provides good 
information “in the large”, but very little “in the small”.  
Overall, these analyses support one of the main premises of this paper, namely that 
predicting performance is difficult, and that the first players taken are not reliably better than ones 
taken somewhat later.  Still, we have not yet addressed the question of valuation—do the early 
picks provide sufficient value to justify their high market prices?  To answer this question we 
need a method that considers costs and benefits in terms of utility to the team. We turn to such an 
approach in the next section. 
 
V. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
In this section we estimate the surplus value of drafted players, that is the value they 
provide to the teams less the compensation they are paid.  To estimate the value teams assign to 
various performance levels we start with the assumption that the labor market for veteran players 
(specifically, those in their 6
th year in the league) is efficient.  By the time a player has reached 
his sixth year in the league he is under no obligation to the team that originally drafted him, and 
has had the opportunity to sign (as least one) “free agent” contract.  Players at this point have also 
had five years to establish their quality level, so teams should have a good sense of what they are 
buying, especially when compared to rookie players with no professional experience.  Using 
these data on the compensation of sixth-year players we estimate the value teams assign to 
various performance categories for each position (quarterback, linebacker, etc.).   We then use   
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these estimates to value the performance of all drafted players in their first five years and 
compare these performance valuations to the players’ compensation in order to calculate the 
surplus value a team receives. Our interest is the relationship between surplus value and draft 
order.  
A. Data 
We use the performance data described in the previous section and summarized in Table 
2.  For this analysis, the sample we use is all players who were drafted 1991-1998 so that we 
observe five years of performance for every player.  We place each player-season into one of five 
mutually exclusive categories:  1) not in the league (“NIL”), 2) started 0 games (“DNS”), 3) 
started 8 or fewer games (“Backup”), 4) started more than 8 games (“Starter”), 5) selected to the 
Pro Bowl (“Pro Bowl”).  While the first and last performance categories are obvious boundaries, 
the middle three can be created in a variety of ways.  We chose this particular division to 
emphasize “starters”, defined here as players who started more than half the games (each team 
plays 16 games in the NFL’s regular season). This scheme also has the empirical virtue of 
creating three interior categories of roughly equal size.  
For player i in his t-th year in the league, this scheme produces five variables of the form 
{ } , _0 , 1 it Cat n =
,          ( 8 )  
indicating qualification for performance category n according to the criteria discussed above.  We 








Cat n Cat n
t =
= ∑
,         ( 9 )  
over the first t years in player i’s career. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------   
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The data are summarized in Table 4.  In Panel A, observations are player-seasons.  The 
first category – players who are not in the league – is easily the largest, with 43% of the 
observations.  Categories 2 through 4 are roughly equal in size, with 18%, 17% and 19%, 
respectively.  The 5
th category, Pro Bowls, is the smallest, with 2% of the player-seasons. In 
Panel B, observations are aggregated over a player’s first five seasons.  While the averages for 
each category remain the same, the complete distribution provides a bit more information.  For 
example, we see that the median drafted player is out of the league for two of his first five years, 
and never starts a game.  
B. Analysis 
We are interested in the market value of different levels of player performance – backups, 
starter, Pro Bowl, etc. To do this we investigate the relation between a player’s 6
th-year 
compensation and his performance during his first five years after being drafted.  Specifically, we 
estimate compensation models of the form: 
,6 1 ,5 2 ,5 3 ,5 4 ,5
5, 5 ,
( ) _1 _2 _3 _4
_5 ,
ii i i i
ii i t
Log Comp Cat Cat Cat Cat
Cat
αβ β β β
βε
=+ + + +
++ + ΒΙ
             (10) 
in which I is a vector of indicator variables for the player’s position (quarterback, running back, 
etc.) and  ,5 _ i Cat n
 is player i’s relative frequency in performance category n over his first five 
years. We take the model’s predicted values as the estimated market value of each position-
performance pair.  This general approach is similar to that of previous research on NFL 
compensation (Ahlburg & Dworkin, 1991; Kahn, 1992; Leeds & Kowalewski, 2001) though we 
rely more heavily on performance categories instead of individual statistics.  We omit the bottom 
two performance categories for our estimation.
12  We use tobit regression for our estimates since 
our compensation measure is left-censored at the league minimum.
13 
                                                 
12 This of course collapses them into a single category for this estimation.  We do this because we will 
assume, in the second stage of our analysis, that the value of a player’s performance is zero if he is not on a 
roster. Collapsing these two categories is a means of imposing the zero-value assumption for the category.   
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------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
Table 5 summarizes the compensation data we use as our dependent measures. We show 
the results of this estimation in Table 6. Model 1 uses the player’s cap charge as the dependent 
measure.  Coefficient estimates are in log terms so are difficult to interpret directly – below we 
turn to a table of transformed values to see model implications in real terms.  The coefficients are 
ordered monotonically, as we would expect.  Categories 4 and 5 are significantly different than 
the omitted categories (1&2) and from each other.  In Model 2 we include a variable for the draft-
pick value of each player to test whether, controlling for our performance categories, draft 
position explains 6
th-year compensation. To examine this we add a variable equal to the estimated 
value (from section 3) of the draft pick used to select a player.  The coefficient on this variable is 
not significantly different from zero, and the estimated coefficients on the other variables are 
essentially unchanged. This is important because it tells us that draft order is not capturing some 
other unobserved measure of quality.  In other words, there is nothing in our data to suggest that 
former high draft picks are better players than lower draft picks, beyond what is measured in our 
broad performance categories. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
In the remaining models we use base+bonus compensation as the dependent measure. 
Because we have a longer history of compensation in these terms, using this variable increases 
the size of our sample. This also serves as a robustness test of our model.  In model 3 we restrict 
the estimates to the same sample we use for the cap-charge models so we can compare the results 
directly.  The results are broadly similar, with coefficients ordered monotonically and the top two 
                                                                                                                                                 
There are relatively few player-seasons in the bottom category among the players receiving compensation 
in year 6 (77 out 1370), but their inclusion presumably biases downward the estimates for Category-2 
performance. 
13 These models are censored at $300,000.   
 30 
categories significantly different from the bottom two and from each other.  Draft-pick value is 
positive in this model, though not significantly so.  We expand the sample for model 4, using all 
seven years of data rather than just the three for which cap-charge information is available.  All 
patterns and formal tests are the same.   
To ease the interpretation of model estimates, we transform the predicted values for each 
position and performance category.  These values are summarized for each model in Table 7.  
The most distinct feature of these value estimates is that they increase with performance, as 
expected. For model 1, for example, values range from $0.5 to 1.0 million for category 2 
(Starts==0), $0.7 to 1.36 million in category 3 (Starts<=8), $2.1 to 4.2 million for category 4 
(Starts>8), and  $5.0 to 10.1 million for category 5 (Pro Bowl).  A second feature is that while 
there are small differences across positions, the only significant difference is that quarterbacks are 
valued more highly than other positions.  There are also some differences across models, though 
these are subtle. Broadly, the models give very similar values despite varying both the dependent 
variable and the sample period. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
 The second step in our analysis is to evaluate the costs and benefits of drafting a player.  
To do this we apply the performance value estimates from the previous section to performances 
in players’ first five years.  This provides an estimate of the benefit teams derive from drafting a 
player, having exclusive rights to that player for three years and restricted rights for another two.  
Specifically, we calculate the surplus value for player i in year t,   
,, , ˆˆ Cap Cap Cap
it it it SV PV C =− ,      ( 1 1 )  
where   , ˆCap
it PV , a function of the player’s performance category and position, is the predicted 
value from the compensation model estimated in the previous section, and  ,
Cap
it C
is the player’s 
compensation costs. Our interest is in the relationship between surplus value and draft order.    
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Note that we make all calculations using the player’s cap charge, both for compensation costs and 
as the basis for the performance value estimates. We also calculate an alternative measure of 
surplus value, 
,, , ˆˆ Base Base Base
it it it SV PV C =− ,         
 (12) 
in which the variables are calculated in the same way but rely on base+bonus compensation rather 
than cap charges. We prefer the cap charge to base+bonus both because it is smoother and, since 
the salary cap is a binding constraint, this charge reflects the opportunity cost of paying a player – 
a cap dollar spent on one player cannot be spent on any other. A downside of using cap charges is 
that our data span fewer years.  For this reason, and to check the robustness of our results, we will 
use both approaches.  We explicate our analysis using the cap-charge calculations, but then 
include both in the formal tests.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------- 
Our sample is for the 2000-2002 seasons, including all drafted players in their first five 
years in the league.  The performance value estimates, compensation costs, and surplus value 
calculations are summarized in Table 8.  The mean cap charge is $485,462, while the mean 
estimated performance value is $955,631, resulting in a mean surplus value of $470,169.
14  We 
graph all three variables in Figure 8.  We are most interested in the third panel, estimated surplus 
value as a function of draft order. The market value of draft picks suggests that this relationship 
should be negative – that there should be less surplus value later in the draft.  In fact, the market-
                                                 
14 Our compensation data include only players who appear on a roster in a given season, meaning our cap 
charges do not include any accelerated charges incurred when a player is cut before the end of his contract.  
This creates an upward bias in our cap-based surplus estimates.  We cannot say for sure whether the bias is 
related to draft order, though we strongly suspect it is negatively related to draft order – i.e,. there is less 
upward bias at the top of the draft – and therefore works against our research hypothesis.  The reason for 
this is that high draft picks are much more likely to receive substantial signing bonuses.  Recall that such 
bonuses are paid immediately but amortized across years for cap purposes. Thus when a top pick is cut we 
may miss some of what he was really  paid, thus underestimating his costs.  Note that this bias does not 
exist with the base+bonus compensation measure since the bonus is charged when paid.   
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value curve suggests the relationship should be steeply negative at the top of the draft.  By 
contrast, this graph appears to show a positive relationship between surplus value and draft order, 
especially at the top of the draft.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
------------------------------- 
To represent the data in a more helpful manner we fit lowess curves to these three 
scatterplots. We show these curves in Figure 9.  It is noteworthy  that performance value is 
everywhere higher than compensation costs, and so surplus is always positive.  This implies that 
the rookie cap keeps initial contracts artificially low, at least when compared to the 6
th year 
players who form the basis of our compensation analysis. More central to the thrust of this paper 
is the fact that while both performance and compensation decline with draft order, compensation 
declines more steeply.  Consequently, surplus value increases at the top of the order, rising 
throughout the first round and into the second.  That treasured first pick in the draft is, according 
to this analysis, actually the least valuable pick in the first round!  To be clear, the player taken 
with the first pick does have the highest expected performance (that is, the performance curve is 
monotonically decreasing), but he also has the highest salary, and in terms of performance per 
dollar, is less valuable than players taken in the second round. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
------------------------------- 
To look more closely at the relation between surplus value and draft order we graph that 
lowess curve in isolation in Figure 10. The curve shows positive value everywhere, increasing 
over the first 43 picks before declining for the subsequent 200.  Surplus value reaches its 
maximum of ~$750,000 at the 43
rd pick, i.e., the 10
th pick in the 2
nd round of the draft.
15   
------------------------------- 
                                                 
15 The curve goes back up toward the end of the draft but we do not think much should be made of this.  It 
is primarily due to a single outlier, Tom Brady, the all-pro quarterback for the Patriots who was drafted in 
the 6
th round, position 199!       
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Insert Figure 10 about here 
------------------------------- 
Clearly, considerable caution should be used in interpreting this curve; it is meant to 
summarize the results simply.  We do not have great confidence in its precise shape.  More 
important for our hypothesis is a formal test of the relationship between the estimated surplus 
value and draft order.  Specifically, we need to know whether this relationship is less negative 
than the market value of draft picks.  Having established in section 3 that the market value is 
strongly negative, we will take as a sufficient (and very conservative) test of our hypothesis 
whether the relationship between surplus value and draft order is ever positive.   Of course this 
relationship varies with draft-order, so the formal tests need to be specific to regions of the draft. 
We are distinctly interested in the top of the draft, where the majority of trades – and the 
overwhelming majority of value-weighted trades – occur.  Also, the psychological findings on 
which we base our hypothesis suggest the over-valuation will be most extreme at the top of the 
draft. 
As a formal test we regress estimated surplus value on a linear spline of draft order.  The 
spline is linear within round and knotted between rounds.  Specifically, we estimate 
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                          (13) 
where Roundj is the linear spline for round j.  In this model, then,  j β
 provides the estimated per-
pick change in surplus value during round j.  Estimation results are shown in Table 9, model 1.  
The estimate for Round1 is significantly positive (p<.01), with a slope of +$18,500 per draft pick.  
Five of the subsequent six rounds are negative, though only the estimate for Round2 is 
significantly so (p<.05). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------- 
We also estimate    
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                         (14) 
using the surplus value calculation,  , ˆ Base
it SV , which relies on the base+bonus measure of 
compensation.  We estimate this model over two time periods.  The first is for the same time 
period as the cap-charge model (2000-2002), while the second is for the broader sample (1996-
2002).  Results are shown in Table 9, models 2 and 3, respectively.  Most important, the slope for 
the first round is significantly positive in both models (p<.01).  Estimated first-round slopes are 
actually steeper in these models than in the cap-charge model.  As in the cap-charge model, the 
slopes of subsequent rounds are almost universally negative, though not significantly so.   
Finally, we consider a model for player “careers” rather than seasons.  We calculate a 
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for player i’s average surplus value over the first t years of his career.
16  We then estimate the 
model for how the average surplus value over a player’s first five years varies with draft order, 
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                        (16)  
The results of this estimation are in Table 9, model 4.  We find the same pattern as in the 
previous models – the first round is significantly positive (p<.05) and subsequent rounds are 
negative but not significantly so.  The estimated slope on the first round is $+14,000/pick. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 11 about here 
------------------------------- 
We graph the predicted values from these four models in Figure 10.  The models all peak 
between the first and second round, though we cannot conclude much about the precise location 
                                                 
16 We are unable to calculate a cap-charge version of this 5-year average since we our sample includes only 
three years of cap-charge data.   
 35 
of the peak since the splines are identical for each model and were constructed independently of 
surplus value.  The four models produce patterns that are broadly similar – sharp first-round 
increases followed by gradual, almost monotonic declines. The maximum surplus value is highest 
for the models based on the 2000-2002 period, peaking near $1 million, while the two models 
based on broader samples peak near $750,000.  The first-round increase is sharpest for the two 
base+bonus models using player-season data, both of which show surplus value to be 
approximately $0 at the very top of the draft. 
C. Discussion 
Let’s take stock.  We have shown that the market value of draft picks declines steeply 
with draft order—the last pick in the first round is worth only 25 percent of the first pick even 
though the last pick will command a much smaller salary than the first pick.  These simple facts 
are incontrovertible.  In a rational market such high prices would forecast high returns; in this 
context, stellar performance on the field.  And, teams do show skill in selecting players—using 
any performance measure, the players taken at the top of the draft perform better than those taken 
later.  In fact, performance declines steadily thoughout the draft.  Still, performance does not 
decline steeply enough to be consistent with the very high prices of top picks.  Indeed, we find 
that the expected surplus to the team declines throughout the first round.  The first pick, in fact, 
has an expected surplus lower than any pick in the second round! 
The magnitude of the market discrepancy we have uncovered is strikingly large.  A team 
blessed with the first pick could, though a series of trades, swap that pick for as many as six picks 
in the middle of the second round, each of which is worth considerably more than the single pick 
they gave up.  Mispricing this pronounced raises red flags: is there something we have left out of 
our analysis that can explain the difference between market value and expected surplus?   
Since both the market value of picks and the compensation to players are easily 
observable, the only place our measurements can be seriously off is in valuing performance.  Two 
specific sources of measurement error come to mind.  1.  Do top draft picks provide superior   
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performance in ways that our crude performance measures fail to capture?  2.  Do superstars 
(some of whom are early draft picks) provide value to teams beyond their performance on the 
field, e.g., in extra ticket sales and/or sales of team apparel such as uniform jerseys?  We discuss 
each in turn. 
It is certainly possible that a player such as Peyton Manning provides value to a team 
(leadership?) that is not captured in statistics such as passing yards.  However, we do not think 
this can explain our results.  Most of the variance in player surplus is generated by whether a 
player becomes a regular.  Recall that even first-round draft picks are about as likely to be out of 
the league as playing in the Pro Bowl.  The possibility of landing a so-called “franchise” player is 
simply too remote to be able to explain our results.  Furthermore, if high draft-choices had some 
intangible value to teams beyond their on-field performance this presumably would be revealed 
by a significant coefficient on the draft-order term in our compensation regressions.  Instead, we 
find that draft order is not a significant explanatory variable after controlling for prior 
performance. 
A more subtle argument is that the utility to the team of signing a high draft pick is 
derived from something beyond on-field performance.  A very exciting player, Michael Vick 
comes to mind, might help sell tickets and team paraphernalia even if he doesn’t lead the team to 
many victories.   We are skeptical of such arguments generally.  Few football players (Vick may 
be the only one) have the ability to bring in fans without producing wins.  But in any case, if high 
draft-picks had more fan appeal this should show up in their 6
th year contracts, and we find no 
evidence for it.   
We have also conducted some other analyses not reported here that add support to the 
interpretation that high draft-picks are bad investments.  For example, for running backs and wide 
receivers we have computed the statistic “yards gained per dollar of compensation” (using total 
rushing, receiving and return yards).  This simple performance statistic increases with draft order 
at the top of the draft in each of the players’ 4 years.  We have also computed the number of   
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games started divided by compensation paid for the first two rounds of the draft, and we find 
similar results:  games started per dollar increases throughout the first two rounds.  Pro Bowl 
appearances per dollar of compensation also increases, even more sharply.  Finally, we have 
estimated the surplus-value-by-draft-order curve shown in Figure 10 separately for two groups of 
players:  “ball handlers” (quarterbacks, wide-receivers and running backs) and others.  
Presumably, if teams are using high draft-picks to generate fan interest for reasons beyond 
winning games this argument would apply primarily to the ball handlers who generate the most 
attention.  Yet, we find a significantly positive slope of the surplus value curve for non-ball-
handlers throughout the first round. 
 
.   
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Psychologists who study decision making are sometimes criticized for devising what are 
said to be artificial, contrived, laboratory experiments in which subjects are somehow tricked into 
making a mistake.  In the “real world”, the critics allege, people learn over time to do pretty well.  
Furthermore, the critics add, people specialize, so many difficult decisions are taken by those 
whose aptitude, training, and experience make them likely to avoid the mistakes that are so 
prevalent in the lab.  This criticism is misguided on many counts.   For example, we all have to 
decide whether to marry, choose careers, and save for retirement, whether or not we are experts—
whatever that might mean—in the relevant domain.  More germane to the topic of this paper, 
even professionals who are highly skilled and knowledgeable in their area of expertise are not 
necessarily experts at making good judgments and decisions.  Numerous studies find, for 
example, that physicians, among the most educated professionals in our society, make diagnoses 
that display overconfidence and violate Bayes’ rule (cf. Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 
1981; Eddy, 1982). The point, of course, is that physicians are experts at medicine, not   
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necessarily probabilistic reasoning.  And it should not be surprising that when faced with difficult 
problems, such as inferring the probability that a patient has cancer from a given test, physicians 
will be prone to the same types of errors that subjects display in the laboratory.  Such findings 
reveal only that physicians are human. 
Our modest claim in this paper is that the owners and managers of National Football 
League teams are also human, and that market forces have not been strong enough to overcome 
these human failings.  The task of picking players, as we have described here, is an extremely 
difficult one, much more difficult than the tasks psychologists typically pose to their subjects.  
Teams must first make predictions about the future performance of (frequently) immature young 
men.  Then they must make judgments about their own abilities:  how much confidence should 
the team have in its forecasting skills?  As we detailed in section 2, human nature conspires to 
make it extremely difficult to avoid overconfidence in this task.  The more information teams 
acquire about players, the more overconfident they will feel about their ability to make fine 
distinctions.  And, though it would seem that there are good opportunities for teams to learn, true 
learning would require the type of systematic data collection and analysis effort that we have 
undertaken here.  Organizations rarely have the inclination to indulge in such time-intensive 
analysis.   In the absence of systematic data collection, learning will be inhibited by bad 
memories and hindsight bias.   
We began this study with the strong intuition that teams were putting too high a value on 
choosing early in the draft.  We thought it crazy for the Giants to give up so many picks for the 
opportunity to move up from the fourth pick to the first one (regardless of which player they 
chose).  But we concede that we did not expect the findings to be as strong as those we report.  
Rather than a treasure, the right to pick first appears to be a curse.  If picks are valued by the 
surplus they produce, then the first pick in the first round is the worst pick in the round, not the 
best!  In paying a steep price to trade up, teams seem to be getting the sign wrong!   We have 
done numerous “reality checks” to see whether these surprising conclusions are robust, and every   
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analysis gives qualitatively similar results.  So, suppose our analyses are taken at face value.  Can 
they be right?  This is a big market, after all, with franchises worth perhaps $1 billion or more.   
We think that while our results are surprising, they are plausible.  We suspect that some 
teams have not fully come to grips with the implications of the salary cap, a relatively new 
innovation.  Buying expensive players, even if they turn out to be great performers, imposes 
opportunity costs elsewhere on the roster.  Spending $10 million on a star quarterback instead of 
$5 million on a journeyman implies having $5 million less to spend on offensive linemen to block 
or linebackers to tackle.  Some of the successful franchises seem to understand these concepts, 
most notably the New England Patriots, but others do not. Whether because they are smart about 
these ideas or others, the Patriots have been doing well recently, and so have not had high draft 
picks to use.  We can only speculate about whether they would trade down if they somehow 
ended up with one of the earliest and most overvalued picks.  But notice that if a few teams do 
learn and have winning records, there is no market action they can take to make the implied value 
of draft picks rational.  Indeed, the irony of our results is that the supposed benefit bestowed on 
the worst team in the league, the right to pick first in the draft, is really not a benefit at all, unless 
the team trades it away.
17  The first pick in the draft is the loser’s curse. 
The loser’s curse can persist even in competitive markets for a reason similar to why the 
winner’s curse can persist:  there are limits to arbitrage.  If naïve oil companies bid too much for 
drilling rights, then sophisticated competitors can only sit on the sidelines and hope their 
competitors go broke – or eventually learn.  Since there is no way to sell the oil leases short, the 
smart money cannot actively drive the prices down.  Similarly, since there is no way to sell the 
first draft pick short, there is no way for any team other than the one that owns the pick to exploit 
the teams that put too high a value on it  Finally, now that the draft-pick value curve is widely 
used and accepted in the NFL a team that owns a top draft pick and would like to trade it may be 
                                                 
17 We do note that the San Diego Chargers, the team that took Ryan Leaf with the second pick only to have 
him flop, has now traded the number one pick twice.  This year they are headed to the playoffs.  Lesson 
learned?   
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reluctant to make a trade at less than “full value”.  So, even trading down will be hard unless 
there is a buyer willing to pay the inflated but conventional price.   
The implications of this study extend beyond the gridiron.  Football players are surely not 
the only employees whose future performance is difficult to predict.  In fact, football teams 
almost certainly are in a better position to predict performance than most employers choosing 
workers.  Teams get to watch their job candidates perform a very similar task at the college level 
and then get to administer additional tests on highly diagnostic traits such as strength and speed.  
Finally, once hired, performance can and is graded, with every action visible on film from 
multiple angles!  Compare that to a company looking to hire a new CEO (or an investment bank 
hiring an analyst, a law firm hiring an associate, etc.).  Candidates from outside the firm will have 
been performing much of their job out of view.  Outside observers see only a portion of the 
choices made, and options not taken are rarely visible externally.  And, even once a CEO is hired, 
the company’s board of directors is unlikely to be able measure his or her performance nearly as 
accurately as a team can evaluate its quarterback.  In our judgment, there is little reason to think 
that the market for CEOs is more efficient than the market for football players.  Perhaps 
innovative boards of directors should start looking for the next Tom Brady as CEO rather than Eli 
Manning. 
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1998-2004. Excludes trades for which one team exchanged only players or future picks, 
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Figure 2 
Market value of draft picks  
The estimated value of picks in the NFL draft, relative to the first pick. Shown is a 
Weibull distribution with an estimated scale parameter of .148 (se=.03) and an estimated 
shape parameter of .700 (se=.033). Estimates are based on 213 draft-day trades observed 
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Figure 3 
Market value of draft picks, top pick versus rest of bundle, estimated values 
A comparison of estimated values for “both sides” of a trade – the top pick acquired, and 
the net exchange of all other picks in the trade.  These equate to the left-hand and right-
hand sides of expression (4), respectively, calculated with the estimated Weibull 
parameters.  There are at least two interpretations of this graph.  First, it provides an 
evaluation of the fit of the estimated model.  Second, it suggests the relative “bargain” of 
each trade – those below the line represent trades that cost less (from the perspective of 
the party trading up) than expected by the model, while those above the line represent 
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Figure 4 
 Market value of draft picks over time 
The estimated value of picks in the NFL draft, relative to the first pick.  Shown are 
separate estimates for the first half (1988-1996) and second half of the sample period 
(1997-2004). Estimates are based on 276 draft-day trades observed between 1988 and 














































st-year Compensation, by draft order 
Compensation is the cap charge.  Drafted players only, 2000-2002.  Showing only the 
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Figure 6 
Performance statistics, by draft round 
Observations are player-seasons, for the 1991-2002 seasons, for all players drafted 1991-
2002. N=20,874. Graphed are averages for players drafted in each round, relative to the 
averages for players drafted in the first round. Compensation is average base+bonus 
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Figure 7 
Within-Position Relative Performance, by Draft Order 
The probability that a player is better, over his observed career, than subsequent players 
drafted at the same position.  The x axis is the distance between the players compared, in 
terms of players – 1 is a 1-player lag (e.g., is a QB better than the next QB taken), 2 is a 
2-player lag, etc. Two performance statistics are used – average number of starts per 
season, and the probability of making the Pro Bowl per season.  These are each shown for 
two samples – the solid lines are for all rounds in the draft, and the dashed lines are for 
the first round only. Each comparison is coded for one of 3 outcomes – 1 if the higher 
pick is better, 0 if the lower pick is better, and .5 if they are equal. Observations are 
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Figure 8 
Value and compensation by draft order 
Observations are player-seasons.  The sample is for the 2000-2002 seasons, drafted 
payers in their first five years in the NFL, excluding punters and kickers.  A minimal 
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Figure 9 
Performance, Compensation & Surplus 
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Lowess curves. Based on cap charges, 2000-2002.
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Figure 10 
Surplus value by draft order 
Lowess curve for the relationship between estimated surplus value and draft order.  
Underlying observations are player-seasons.  The sample is for the 2000-2002 seasons, 
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Figure 11 
Spline regressions, predicted values 
Regressing estimated surplus value (performance value – compensation cost) on a linear 
spline of the draft order.  The spline is knotted between rounds, so that the x variables 
reflect the estimated slope, i.e., .the change in surplus value, during a draft round. Surplus 
value is calculated using two different measures of compensation – cap charge and 
base+bonus.  Sample is limited to all drafted players, excluding punters and kickers.  


















































0 50 100 150 200 250
Draft Pick
Cap Charge, '00-'02 Base+Bonus, '00-'02




Using non-linear regression to estimate parameter values for a Weibull-function model of 
draft-pick value. Data are draft-day trades, 1988-2004.  Excludes trades involving players 
(n=51), trades for which we have incomplete information (n=6), and trades on the second 
day of the 1990 draft (for which no information is available).  Standard errors are 
italicized. 
 
Model   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)  
Years   ’88-‘04  ’88-‘04   '88-'96   '97-04  
Future Picks  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimates      
lambda 0.148  0.121  0.092 0.249
  0.030 0.023 0.029 0.064
beta 0.700  0.730  0.775 0.608
  0.033 0.030 0.052 0.042
rho   1.738  1.590 1.735
   0.141  0.237 0.126
Market Values (relative to #1) 
10th pick  50%  55%  60% 39%
20th pick  31%  35%  41% 22%
30th pick  21%  24%  29% 15%
40th pick  15%  17%  21% 10%
50th pick  10%  13%  15% 7%
N 213  276  131 145
R-sq 1.00  0.99  0.98 0.99




   
Panel A: Summary statistics.          
          
 Pr(Roster) Games  Starts  Pr(Pro  Bowl)  
Obs          20,874           20,874           20,874          20,874   
Mean 0.47  6.00 3.19 0.02  
SD 0.50  7.04 5.62 0.15  
Min 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  
Max 1.00  16.00 16.00 1.00  
          
Panel B: Mean performance by experience    
         
Year Pr(Roster)  Games  Starts  Pr(Pro  Bowl) Obs 
1  0.661  7.420 2.256 0.004          3,114  
2  0.660  8.235 3.744 0.019          2,852  
3  0.592  7.599 4.112 0.024          2,606  
4  0.527  6.981 4.204 0.034          2,352  
5  0.466  6.233 3.943 0.037          2,099  
6  0.402  5.402 3.494 0.039          1,858  
7  0.342  4.724 3.279 0.038          1,618  
8  0.293  3.899 2.732 0.035          1,364  
9  0.226  2.989 2.083 0.023          1,115  
10  0.165  2.261 1.649 0.015             893  
11  0.088  1.158 0.743 0.007             669  
12  0.063  0.731 0.452 0.006             334  
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Table 3 
Performance data, by draft order 
  
      Pr(Roster)  Games  Starts  Pr(Pro Bowl) 
Round  N  Mean  vs. Rd 1  Mean  vs. Rd 1  Mean  vs. Rd 1  Mean  vs. Rd 1 
1 2,281  0.81  100% 11.15 100% 8.79 100% 0.10  100%
2  2,355  0.71 89% 9.68 87% 6.07 69% 0.04 43%
3  2,478  0.62 77% 7.87 71% 3.73 42% 0.03 26%
4 2,437  0.55  68% 6.68 60% 2.91 33% 0.01 9%
5  2,438  0.43 53% 5.21 47% 2.07 23% 0.02 16%
6  2,600  0.36 45% 4.25 38% 1.57 18% 0.01 10%
7 2,796  0.31  39% 3.50 31% 1.21 14% 0.01 6%
8  924  0.30 37% 3.79 34% 1.72 20% 0.02 15%
9 632  0.20  25% 2.32 21% 1.07 12% 0.00  3%
10 644  0.12  15% 1.56 14% 0.83 9% 0.00  0%
11 645  0.10  13% 1.20 11% 0.30 3% 0.00  0%
12 644  0.13  16% 1.51 14% 0.62 7% 0.00  2%
Total  20,874  0.47    6.00    3.19    0.03   




Summary statistics for performance categories, including performance in a player’s first 
five years, for all players drafted 1991-1998.  Performance categories are comprehensive 
and mutually exclusive.  Observations in Panel A are player-seasons. Observations in 
Panel B are players. 
 
Panel A: Player performance, season-level, years 1-5. 
              
Category Criteria  N  mean  sd  min  p25  p50  p75  max 
              
NIL  Not in league  10,500 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
DNS Starts=0  10,500 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Backup Starts<=8  10,500 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Starter Starts>8  10,500 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pro Bowl  Pro Bowl  10,500 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
              
Panel B: Mean performance by player over 1st 5 years.      
              
Category Criteria  N  mean  sd  min  p25  p50  p75  max 
              
NIL  Not in league     2,099  0.43 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.80 1.00
DNS  Starts=0     2,099  0.18 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 1.00
Backup  Starts<=8     2,099  0.17 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.00
Starter  Starts>8     2,099  0.19 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.00
Pro Bowl  Pro Bowl     2,099  0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.80
 




1996-2002. Includes only players drafted 1991-1997.  Includes only the players’ first six 
years in the league.  Cap charges are available only for 2000-2002. 
 
Panel A: Including players no longer in the league             
              
Compensation  N  mean  sd min  p25 p50 p75  max 
              
Base Salary  6,494  451,273 744,839 0 0 279,346  573,643     9,271,004 
Bonuses 6,494  299,814 739,906 0 0 0  224,592   11,127,144 
Base + Bonus  6,494  756,759 1,281,164 0 0 320,883  883,246   13,905,222 
Cap Charge  1,435  661,699 1,123,345 0 0 0  898,627     8,679,899 
              
Panel B: Including only players still in the league      
              
Compensation  N  mean  sd min  p25 p50 p75    max   
              
Base Salary  3,337  878,205 839,497 91,011 417,953 569,552 1,019,716     9,271,004 
Bonuses 3,337  583,456 948,685 0 23,481 214,160  740,565   11,127,144 
Base + Bonus  3,337  1,472,697 1,462,878 91,011 519,456 860,826 1,945,285   13,905,222 
Cap Charge  621  1,529,047 1,261,074 79,412 537,606 1,104,316 2,108,367     8,679,899 




Tobit regressions of year-6 compensation on performance over the player’s first five 
years, in 2002 $s. Compensation is left-censored at the league minimum (here, 
log($300,000)). Compensation is either the player’s charge against the salary cap (models 
1-2) or the sum of his salary and bonuses (models 3-4). Sample is all drafted players, 
1991-1997, who are on a roster in their sixth year, excluding kicker and punters. Omitted 
performance category is Starts=0. Position fixed-effects are included but not shown. 
Draft-pick value is estimated (above) from draft-day trades, 1988-2004.  
  
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
  Salary Cap     Base + Bonus 
  2000-2002 2000-2002  2000-2002 1996-2002 
Starts<=8, avg  0.306  0.316 0.045 0.071
 [0.205]  [0.206] [0.220] [0.130]
Starts>8, avg  1.431  1.459 1.329 1.417
 [0.130]**  [0.140]** [0.149]** [0.097]**
Pro Bowl, avg  2.308  2.363 1.849 2.107
 [0.222]**  [0.244]** [0.262]** [0.175]**
Draft-pick value    -0.098 0.251 0.215
   [0.185] [0.198] [0.125]
Constant 13.818  13.824 13.969 13.837
   [0.210]**  [0.210]**   [0.225]** [0.122]**
Pseudo R2  0.329  0.295  0.253 0.252
Log Likelihood  -230.83  -230.69   -248.68 -602.51
Observations 274  274 274 661
Left-censored 4  4  2 4
Uncensored 270  270  272 657
Censor value  12.61  12.61   12.61 12.61
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Table 7 
Estimated performance value, by position 
Predicted values from the models reported in Table 6. In 2002 $s.  Note that predicted values 
apply when a performance category x variable equals 1.  Hence, these values are the model 
predictions for the player performance that falls into a category all 5 years.  The draft-pick values 
used for the model predictions are the averages for each position-performance pairing in the 
sample used for the tobit regression.   
      (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
   Salary Cap   Base + Bonus 
Cat  Pos  2000-2002 2000-2002  2000-2002 1996-2002 
Starts=0 DB  552,215 546,107 650,590 730,439
 DL  687,811  681,808 804,039 807,545
 LB  566,319  562,136 700,788 717,361
 OL  502,176  496,452 634,252 664,817
 QB  1,002,539  1,000,197 1,189,641 1,039,870
 RB  521,700  513,766 675,598 710,231
 TE  520,289  514,538 781,997 681,533
 WR  665,258  661,378 731,956 781,979
    
Starts<=8  DB        749,718        744,700       690,680       794,396 
  DL        933,812        928,259       857,095       881,345 
  LB        768,866        765,626       746,290       782,255 
  OL        681,782        680,836       663,635       714,100 
  QB     1,361,104     1,364,835    1,260,780    1,129,260 
  RB        708,289        701,955       713,684       769,148 
  TE        706,373        706,954       814,336       729,076 
  WR        903,192        900,335       780,497       853,668 
    
Starts>8  DB     2,310,530     2,317,961    2,543,610    3,105,027 
  DL     2,877,882     2,888,141    3,159,747    3,447,937 
  LB     2,369,542     2,387,840    2,734,457    3,044,277 
  OL     2,101,163     2,110,926    2,468,537    2,815,147 
  QB     4,194,740     4,200,189    4,780,221    4,525,227 
  RB     2,182,854     2,187,005    2,621,899    3,000,045 
  TE     2,176,950     2,193,064    3,025,005    2,870,848 
  WR     2,783,517     2,790,640    2,905,468    3,367,574 
    
Pro Bowl  DB     5,550,132     5,719,288    4,283,818    6,192,617 
  DL     6,912,970     7,021,486    5,526,844    7,103,115 
  LB     5,691,886     5,871,529    4,645,843    6,117,273 
  OL     5,047,206     5,058,486    4,480,186    5,985,725 
  QB   10,076,199   10,268,860    8,241,777    9,208,248 
  RB     5,243,436     5,360,122    4,492,080    6,071,787 
  TE     5,229,253     5,387,191    5,152,666    5,781,453 
  WR     6,686,295     6,855,982    4,947,470    6,779,927 
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 Table 8 
Player Costs and Benefits 
2000-2002 seasons, in 2002 dollars. Includes all drafted players in their first five years in the 
league, excluding punters and kickers. 
 
Variable N  mean  sd  min  p25  p50  p75  max 
Cap Charge (C )  3,532  485,462 764,060 0 0 311,153  567,369  10,334,483
Estimated Value (V) 3,532  955,631 1,314,062 0 0 566,320 1,361,109  10,076,233
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Table 9 
Spline Regressions 
Regressing estimated surplus value (performance value – compensation cost) on a linear spline 
of the draft order.  The spline is knotted between rounds, so that the x variables reflect the 
estimated slope, i.e., .the change in surplus, during a draft round. Surplus value is calculated 
using two different measures of compensation – cap charge and base+bonus.  Observations are 
player-season, except for model 4, which is player-career, i.e., a player’s average surplus over his 
first five years.  Sample is limited to all drafted players, excluding punters and kickers.  Reported 
in 2002 dollars. 
  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Basis for Surplus  Cap  Base+Bonus  Base+Bonus  Base+Bonus 
Sample 2000-2002 2000-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 
Observations Player-Season  Player-Season Player-Season Player-Career 
Round1 18,553.87  31,896.13 29,413.63 14,492.71
 [3,866.591]**  [5,000.468]** [3,006.051]** [5,614.419]*
Round2 -6,912.95  -9,944.56 -4,471.08 -421.256
 [3,035.595]*  [3,925.783]* [2,350.429] [4,398.913]
Round3 -5,737.56  -3,903.16 -4,246.59 -5,658.61
 [2,975.638]  [3,848.244] [2,298.657] [4,338.640]
Round4 -5,478.00  -3,634.74 -3,124.70 -3,942.32
 [2,974.153]  [3,846.322] [2,302.944] [4,364.393]
Round5 -4,472.07  -4,852.06 -3,533.44 -2,104.10
 [2,948.024]  [3,812.532] [2,281.149] [4,314.675]
Round6 1,775.00  1,477.54 -227.911 -1,156.03
 [2,793.427]  [3,612.599] [2,159.746] [4,074.920]
Round7 -2,186.13  -2,078.01 -1,395.98 -3,188.80
 [1,808.139]  [2,338.376] [1,456.271] [2,809.491]
Constant 372,047.78  -21,745.27 -149,781.57 253,100.97
   [86,667.112]**  [112,082.232] [67,355.703]* [125,994.991]*
Observations 3502  3502 8021 717
R-squared 0.06  0.03 0.03 0.07
 
 
 